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Marine Casualty Investigations

Enquêtes sur les accidents maritimes

Canada

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FISHING VESSELS

Summaries of Reports of Investigations
into Marine Casualties and Accidents
Aboard Ships

Issue No. 7 April 1989

Summaries of Fishing Vessel Marine Casualties and Accidents

This publication summarizes the Reports of Investigation into marine casualties and/or marine accidents involving fishing vessels which were investigated by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division of Transport Canada and is published three times a year. There is another publication covering commercial vessels and other craft.

Note:

1. A glossary of terms and abbreviations used can be found at the end of this publication.

2. Unless stated otherwise, all times mentioned in this publication are local times.

3. Unless stated otherwise, all Regulations referred to in this publication are made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act.

The full report of the summaries contained herein may be obtained by writing to:

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Transport Canada
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Their contents may be deficient and misleading if used in any other process and are not to be used or admitted in evidence in any legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, arising out of any casualty described therein. The statements, opinions and findings in the reports and summaries are those of the Marine Casualty Investigations Division only and do not constitute admissions made by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada.

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"CAPE JAMES"

Grounded at Hanmer Island, Arthur Passage, B.C.
March 13, 1988.

Summary

The twin screw, 256 gross ton seiner/trawler "CAPE JAMES" is a large, wood-hulled, Canadian fishing vessel. On March 13, 1988, the vessel, with a crew of 6, was en route to Prince Rupert, B.C. to discharge her catch of 150 tons of herring. The master navigated the vessel by radar distances off known landmarks and by local knowledge.

At 1800, the mate and a deck-hand came on watch. The mate was briefed by the master and instructed that should he not be able to maintain a CPA of 0.75 mile off-shore and to approaching traffic, he should call the master immediately. The deck-hand expressed a desire to learn navigation and during the watch the mate taught him the basics of navigation.

It was reported that at 2325 the mate fixed the vessel's position as 4 cables east of Herbert Reefs and reportedly laid off a course of 305°(M) for Genn Islands light which would have allowed the vessel to pass between Hanmer Island and Elliott Island. At 2345, the vessel's course was altered and reportedly the vessel's new heading was checked by radar and visually. It was estimated that the vessel would pass about 2.5 cables south of Hanmer Island. About a minute later, the depth was observed to be reducing rapidly on the depth sounder and a full port helm was applied. Before any further action could be taken, the vessel grounded at about 2347 on Hanmer Island some 3 minutes after high water. Both engines were put in neutral. The master arrived on the bridge and informed Prince Rupert CGRS of the casualty. Meanwhile an inspection of the vessel indicated that she was not taking on water.

Initial efforts to refloat the vessel were unsuccessful however, following the arrival of the tug "RIVTOW DAWN", the "CAPE JAMES" was finally refloated at 0916 the following day. Some water was found to be entering the forepeak and the rate of ingress was controlled with the vessel's pumps. The vessel was escorted to Prince Rupert by the tug and, following her arrival, an underwater survey revealed damage to her forefoot, port keel-cooler and bottom planking. Repairs were estimated to cost $125,000.

Findings

On March 13, 1988 the Canadian fishing vessel "CAPE JAMES", northbound in Arthur Passage, B.C. at a service speed of 9 knots, with a mate and look-out on the bridge, grounded on Hanmer Island, B.C. due to an error in navigation during the hours of darkness but otherwise good weather conditions.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the grounding:

- a proper look-out was not maintained in accordance with Section 9, Part I of the Recommended Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices, 1985;
- the position of vessel was not positively ascertained prior to the last alteration of course;
- the extent of the alteration was not sufficient for the vessel to safely clear Hanmer Island;
- the intended voyage was not planned in advance in accordance with section 6(a), Part I of the Recommended Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices, 1985;
- the attention of the mate on watch was divided between the navigation of the vessel and teaching navigation to the deck-hand;
- the radar display was not observed carefully or effective plotting maintained as recommended in section 15, Part II of the Recommended Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices, 1985; and
- principally by not keeping a proper record of the movements of the vessel, the OOW did not meet his obligations under section 8, Part I of the Recommended Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices, 1985.

Other Findings

Those having the conduct did not comply with the master's verbal instruction that he be called if a CPA of 0.75 mile from shore or an approaching vessel could not be maintained.

The vessel did not meet the requirements of the Charts and Publications Regulations in that the chart in use was outdated.


20'
15'
10'
TRACK OF THE "CAPE JAMES" BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE PLOTTER'S MEMORY
SILLAGE DU "CAPE JAMES" BASÉ SUR L'INFORMATION OBTENUE DE LA MÉMOIRE DU PLOTTEUR
"CAPE JAMES"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3927
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3927 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
GROUNDING POSITION
LIEU DE L'ÉCHOUEMENT
ALTERED COURSE
CHANGEMENT DE CAP
WARCUS PASSAGE
See CAUTION
Voir ATTENTION
LAWYER ISLANDS
Croasdaile I
Gamble Pt
Little Genn I
BASE SAND
Georgy Pt
Marked Tree Bluff
Cecil Patch
Hanmer I
McMicking Island
Chatsmore Passage
Chalmers Inlet
Elliott Island
KENNEDY ISLAND
Lewis Island
Godfrey Pt
Kelp Passage
BRITISH COLUMBIA
PRINCE RUPERT
KITIMAT
PRINCE GEORGE
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER ISLAND
NANAIMO
VICTORIA

"CAPE JAMES"

Damaged forefoot.

Brion endommagé.

"NORTHERN OSPREY"

Loss of leg of a crew member off Cape Bonavista, Nfld., MARCH 16, 1988.

Summary

The ex-Norwegian registered 1674 gross ton fishing trawler "NORTHERN OSPREY" had recently been purchased by her new owner and transferred to Canadian registry; however, the medical supplies carried under the former registry were still on board. After shooting away her nets in position 48°44'N 50°41'W off the Newfoundland's North-east coast in good weather conditions, the second engineer and the deck trawl boss were returning to the accommodation when the former noticed a puff of smoke emitting from the starboard winch clutch assembly. Examination revealed that the lower brass sliding shoe had slipped off its retaining pin of the yoke and had become stuck in the groove of the dog clutch, up against the upper shoe.

The electro-hydraulically driven 'split-trawl' type winch, located about amidships on the weather deck, was connected to a 'trawl-data' computer to provide an automated system of trawling in addition to the traditional manual system. When the winch is in the automated mode as at the time of the accident, any change detected by the warp tension sensor would activate one or both winch drums to either 'heave-in' or 'pay-out' as required to keep the mouth of the trawl open and equidistant behind the vessel.

The second engineer, without advising anybody, mounted the starboard winch from its forward end and positioned himself atop the clutch assembly while standing on the support beam span between it (clutch assembly) and the bull gear wheel and attempted to pry the displaced shoe free; the attempt was unsuccessful. As the master, positioned at the winch controls on the bridge, noticed the second engineer who had begun to retrace his steps to dismount the winch, he shouted to the second engineer to get clear, when the winch automatically began to compensate, heaving in on the starboard winch. The second engineer's left foot on the bull gear wheel support span beam became caught between the beam and one of the fins of the bull gear wheel. He called out that he was caught and motioned to stop the winch and back it off (reverse the rotation). The master immediately applied the brake.

In an effort to free the man's foot, the master released the brake and activated the winch control to override the automatic setting. However, before that action could be completed, the automatic mode took over and began again to

heave-in. The winch made several quick turns before the brake could be reapplied. The victim's foot and left leg were consequently pulled between the fins of the bull gear wheel and its support span beam, severing the leg just above the knee. The victim lost his balance and fell backwards aft over the winch spooling gear guide arm. He was caught as he fell by the deck crew trawl boss who had remained on deck and was standing just aft of the winch. The victim remained conscious and clutched the stump of his severed leg to minimize bleeding.

The master immediately attended to the injured man administering first aid while the mate, under instructions from the master, radioed Coast Guard for assistance. First aid to stop bleeding was rendered and a 50 mg injection of 'petidin' in the left stump near the hip was administered. At 1640, communications with the Health Science complex in St. John's, Nfld., was established and 'MEDEVAC' was recommended by the doctor. However, the weather conditions ashore prevented the helicopter from becoming airborne. Thus, the vessel, after taking in her nets, was diverted to St. John's arriving there at 0015 the following day. The victim was transported to a hospital where he underwent emergency surgery but the limb could not be re-attached.

After a number of surgical operations over the next 6 weeks, the victim was released and returned to his home where he is now functioning with the aid of the crutches.

Findings

During a fishing operation at sea on March 16, 1988 at 1620, while attempting to rectify a malfunction of the starboard split trawl winch, the second engineer aboard the fishing trawler "NORTHERN OSPREY" lost his leg above the knee. It would appear that:

- the lower sliding shoe of the dog clutch yoke assembly became dislodged;

- the victim, of his own volition, mounted the winch to effect repairs and not recognizing the hazard stood over the assembly in an area where the protective guard over the bull gear did not extend;

- the victim attempted to effect repair without notifying the bridge of his intention, and thus have the winch immobilised; and

- the winch being left in automatic mode, activated.

Other Findings

The deck crew trawl boss saved the victim further injury by catching him before the victim fell to the deck.

The requirement to carry certain medical supplies whilst previously under Norwegian registry, in addition to those currently required under Canadian Registry, resulted in the victim being administered more appropriate treatment.

The victim's action in clutching the stump of his severed leg effectively reduced the loss of blood and increased his chances of survival.


"NORTHERN OSPREY"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. L/C 4001
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° L/C 4001 DU SHC
DEPTH IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
POSITION AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT
POSITION AU MOMENT DE L'ACCIDENT
LABRADOR CURRENT - Inshore Branch
COURANT DU LABRADOR - Composante côtière
55°00'W
50°00'W
50°00'N
/TERRE-NEUVE
ST JOHN'S
Holyrood
AVALON PENINSULA
St.Anthony
CORNER BROOK
GANDER
CHANNEL-PORT aux BASQUES
ST JOHN'S

"NORTHERN OSPREY"

Dog clutch yoke situated between housed-in bull gear and winch drum looking aft. Clutch disengaged.

Tourniquet de fermeture de la traverse entre le margouillet encastré et le tambour du treuil. Vu de l'arrière, l'engrenage est débrayé.



View from aft of starboard winch.
Victim mounted winch from forward side.
Note: Fins partially covered by guard left of clutch assembly.

Vue de l'arrière du treuil tribord.
La victime a chevauché le treuil par l'avant.
Nota: Le dispositif de sécurité à gauche de l'embrayage couvre partiellement les ailerettes.

"TIN MAN"

Foundering south-east of Quadra Island, B.C., April 5, 1988 with loss of one life.

Summary

The 5 gross ton American fishing vessel "TIN MAN" was fitted with a hydraulically operated herring shaker forward of the wheel-house and a bow-mounted hydraulic net hauler. The vessel was not inspected by the USCG nor was she required to be by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Although capable of making the voyage on her own from Bellingham, Washington, U.S.A. to Sitka, Alaska, it was arranged that the "BLUE FINN" would tow the "TIN MAN" to her destination and that the operator of the "TIN MAN" in turn released the owners, the skipper and the crew from all liability due to any mishap in the tow or transport of the vessel.

The "BLUE FINN" departed Bellingham at 1530, April 5, 1988, with the "TIN MAN" in tow. A small craft advisory was in effect with SE'ly winds of 10-20 knots forecast for Georgia Strait. When abeam of Sand Heads, B.C., at 1900, winds were recorded as SW at 20 knots and visibility good. The "BLUE FINN" advised the "TIN MAN" at 2100, that the gale warning for Johnstone Strait had been upgraded to storm warning, with SE'ly winds of 40 to 55 knots forecast for early Tuesday morning and that the "TIN MAN" should seek shelter at Nanaimo. The operator of the "TIN MAN" decided against seeking shelter and continued under tow.

At 0300, with SE'ly winds of 50 knots and in 2-5 m rough and confused seas, the starboard towing bridle of the "TIN MAN" parted and her operator requested that the towline be cast off. After experiencing considerable difficulty, the "BLUE FINN" was able to cast off the towline some 15 minutes later. The towline was then hauled aboard the "TIN MAN" and the operator informed the "BLUE FINN" that everything appeared normal and continued to follow astern. At about 0440, the operator of the "TIN MAN" reportedly remarked that the vessel was not handling very well in a following sea and that he was experiencing difficulty in steering the vessel. The "TIN MAN" broadcast a 'MAYDAY' on VHF R/T channel 69 at 0515, and requested assistance from the "BLUE FINN". The 'MAYDAY' was acknowledged and Comox CGRS advised, thus initiating SAR response. Meanwhile, after a short delay due to adverse weather conditions, the "BLUE FINN" managed to turn around and commenced searching for the "TIN MAN".

A total of 6 marine units and 2 air units were used in the search. At 1054 the vessel was found capsized south of Cape Mudge and at 1316, the operator's body was found on the beach and transported to Campbell River hospital. An autopsy

subsequently determined the cause of death to be due to drowning in sea water.

The "TIN MAN", valued at U.S. $35,000, was subsequently salvaged and towed to Campbell River. The vessel sustained about $12,000 damage and the salvage costs were about $5,000.

Findings

In the morning of April 5, 1988, the American fishing vessel "TIN MAN" foundered off Cape Mudge, Quadra Island, B.C. in extremely adverse weather and sea conditions with the loss of one crew member.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the casualty:

- the "TIN MAN" was being operated in weather and sea conditions for which she was not designed;
- small craft warnings, gale and storm warnings for Georgia Strait and Johnstone Strait were ignored;
- at some stage, a loose rag, floating in water taken into the engine compartment, disabled the bilge pump by displacing the drive belts; and
- advice from the "BLUE FINN" that the "TIN MAN" seek shelter at Nanaimo, B.C., was ignored as was a later recommendation to sail close to shore in less turbulent waters.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the loss of life:

- when located, the deceased was not wearing a life-jacket or a personal flotation device; and
- the weather and sea conditions were such as to preclude immediate location and rescue of a person in the water.

Other Findings

The 'MAYDAY' was broadcast on the mutually agreed communication channel 69 VHF and not on the International Distress Safety and Calling frequency, channel 16.


ATTENTION
Accompagnant un courant de flot et des vents du sud ou du sud-est, un puissant raz au large de Cape Mudge croise souvent l'entrée de Discovery Passage. Avec des grands vents, le raz constitue un danger pour les petits navires.
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER ISLAND
NANAIMO
VICTORIA
Fraser R.
Adjoining Chart/Carte adjacente 3539
DISCOVERY PASSAGE
IR
Yaculta
Francisco Pt
Cape Mudge
CAMPBELL RIVER HARBOUR LIMIT
LIMITE DU PORT DE CAMPBELL RIVER
Chart/Carte 3540
See CAUTION/Voir ATTENTION
WILBY SHOALS
Willow R.
BODY OF OPERATOR LOCATED
CORPS DE L'OPÉRATEUR RETROUVÉ
"TIN MAN" LOCATED APRIL 5, 1988
"TIN MAN" RETROUVÉ LE 5 AVRIL 1988
APPROXIMATE TRACK OF "BLUE FINN" AND "TIN MAN"
SILLAGE APPROXIMATIF DU "BLUE FINN" ET DU "TIN MAN"
"TIN MAN"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3538
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3538 DU SHC
SOUNDINGS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
50°
59'
58'
125°10'



"TIN MAN", damaged port rail and wheel-house.
"TIN MAN", lisse bâbord et timonerie endommagées.

"NIPIGON QUEEN"/"TERESA MARIA"

**Collision in Long Point Bay, Lake Erie,
April 6, 1988.**

Summary

"NIPIGON QUEEN"

The "NIPIGON QUEEN", a 46 gross ton, 16.92 m long Canadian gillnetter was of a slightly different configuration compared to a typical Lake Erie fishing vessel in that the wheel-house is not raised above the deck-house. The operator's field of vision from the steering position located at the forward end of the deck-house and with the side doors closed is obscured abaft the beam on the port side although windows are fitted on both sides of the deck-house. The vessel was not fitted with appropriate navigation lights, and the Steamship Inspection Certificate restricted her operation to daylight hours only. Her navigation equipment included a Loran C, echo sounder, magnetic compass, autopilot and VHF.

The "NIPIGON QUEEN" departed Port Dover at about 0500, April 6, 1988, following two or three other fishing vessels, bound for the fishing grounds off Long Point. The bridge was manned by the skipper only; the vessel was on autopilot on a course of 156°(M) and proceeding at a speed of about 10 knots while the crew were resting in the deck-house. She was unaware of the presence of F/V "TERESA MARIA" that she was overtaking and with which vessel she was on a collision course. At about 0600, in darkness but good weather and visibility conditions, a "bang" was heard and white superstructure sighted when the bow of the "NIPIGON QUEEN" collided with the starboard side of the "TERESA MARIA" resulting in minor damage to the vessel. The vessel continued ahead until she cleared the "TERESA MARIA".

"TERESA MARIA"

The 121 gross ton, 20.88 m long Canadian trawler "TERESA MARIA" is a Lake Erie trawler with the wheel-house slightly higher than the deck-house. The vessel was fitted with appropriate navigation lights, the status of which could be monitored on a console located in the wheel-house. Included in her navigation equipment were a radar, echo sounder, Loran C, VHF, video plotter, magnetic compass and autopilot.

The "TERESA MARIA" departed Port Dover at 0430, April 6, 1988 bound for the fishing grounds off Long Point. After setting the trawl and, with the skipper alone in the wheel-house, the vessel's speed was adjusted to 2.7 knots over the ground; the vessel was on hand steering and the radar on

6 mile range. From the steering position in the centre of the wheel-house, the skipper's field of vision was restricted to from right ahead to 22½° abaft the beam on either side. The skipper was unaware of the presence of the overtaking vessel "NIPIGON QUEEN" which was on a collision course and close astern on her starboard quarter. At 0600, with the vessel on a course of 185°(M), a "bang" was heard when the bow of the "NIPIGON QUEEN" collided with the starboard side of the "TERESA MARIA". The vessel was stopped; the minor damage examined.

Events following the collision

The "TERESA MARIA" established VHF R/T contact with the "NIPIGON QUEEN" and after exchanging information, both vessels continued their operations. Before dawn the same day, when another fishing vessel passed the "TERESA MARIA" some 500 m away, only a green light high above the hull of the latter was visible.

Findings

The Canadian fishing vessels "NIPIGON QUEEN" and "TERESA MARIA" were involved in a collision when the "NIPIGON QUEEN" was overtaking the "TERESA MARIA" in the waters of Long Point Bay, Lake Erie in the predawn darkness, but in fine, clear weather on April 6, 1988, causing minor damage to both vessels.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the casualty:

"NIPIGON QUEEN"

- in not keeping out of the way of the "TERESA MARIA", she did not meet the obligation of an overtaking vessel under Rule 13 of the Collision Regulations;

- in not taking an early and substantial action to keep well clear of the "TERESA MARIA", she did not meet the obligation of a 'give-way' vessel under Rule 16 of the Collision Regulations;

- in not maintaining a proper look-out so as to make a full appraisal of the situation, she did not meet her obligation under Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations;

- in not ascertaining if risk of collision existed, she did not meet her obligation under Rule 7 of the Collision Regulations;

- in not exhibiting the proper masthead light forward or the sidelights, she did not meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Collision Regulations for a power-driven vessel underway; and

- in not proceeding to the fishing grounds during daylight hours only, she did not conform with the limitations placed on her by the Steamship Inspection Certificate.

"TERESA MARIA"

- in not maintaining a proper look-out so as to make a full appraisal of the situation, she did not meet her obligation under Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations;

- in not ascertaining if risk of collision existed, she did not meet her obligation under Rule 7 of the Collision Regulations;

- in not taking any action when collision was imminent, she did not meet the obligation of a 'stand-on' vessel under Rule 17(b) of the Collision Regulations; and

- in not exhibiting the sidelights and/or the lower white all-round light, she did not meet the requirements of Rule 26 of the Collision Regulations for a vessel engaged in trawling.

Other Findings

Neither the "NIPIGON QUEEN" nor the "TERESA MARIA" had their radio stations licensed by the Minister of Communications as required by the Radio Act.

None of the crew aboard either vessel held a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (Maritime) as required by Part II of the General Radio Regulations.

Neither vessel reported the casualty immediately by radio to a Canadian radio ship reporting station as required by the Shipping Casualties Reporting Regulations. The "TERESA MARIA" delayed reporting until over three hours had elapsed, and "NIPIGON QUEEN" only when prompted by the CGRS Sarnia three hours, forty-five minutes later.

Neither vessel had efficient provisions for visibility astern from the steering position in the wheel-house.

RECONSTRUCTED TRACKS OF THE "NIPIGON QUEEN" AND THE "TERESA MARIA" BASED ON THE REPORTED COURSES AND SPEEDS

SILLAGES DU "NIPIGON QUEEN" ET DU "TERESA MARIA" RECONSTITUÉS D'APRÈS LES ROUTES ET LES VITESSES RAPPORTÉES

TRACKS, POSITIONS AND TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY

SILLAGES, POSITIONS ET TEMPS UNIQUEMENT APPROXIMATIFS

DIAGRAM OF VESSELS NOT TO SCALE

DIAGRAMME DES NAVIRES PAS À L'ÉCHELLE




ONTARIO
MICHIGAN
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
OHIO
CANADA
USA / E UA
COLLISION
ABORDAGE
Port Maitland
BUFFALO
Port Colborne
Port Stanley
Port Burwell
Long Point
Dunkirk
DETROIT
WINDSOR
Rondeau Hr
Erie
Fingsville
Ashtabula
Fairport
TOLEDO
Lorain
CLEVELAND
SANDUSKY
Huron
INSERT FROM CHS
CHART No. L/C 2100
CARTOUCHE DE LA
CARTE N° L/C DU SHC

"NIPIGON QUEEN"

Note: Visibility from steering position restricted to forward of the beam.

Remarque: Visibilité à la barre Est réduite à l'avant du travers.

"TERESA MARIA"

Note: Visibility from steering position restricted forward to two points abaft the beam.

Remarque: Visibilité à la barre Est réduite de l'avant jusqu'à deux points sur l'arrière du travers.

"WENBROOKE"

Sinking off Amphitrite Point, B.C., April 11, 1988.

Summary

The 40 gross ton, 14.26 m long "WENBROOKE" was a typical Canadian west coast troller. The cabin/wheel-house was situated forward of midships above the engine-room. A door in the after end of the wheel-house provided access to the main deck. Aft of the cabin was the fish hold, followed by the freezer room and the cockpit above the lazaret; the latter three were watertight compartments. The cockpit covers were not designed to be watertight nor were they secured and access to the lazaret was by way of 2 manhole covers one on each side that were reportedly missing at the time of the casualty. Subsequent to a Steamship Inspection in 1985, the vessel was converted to a trawler in 1986. This conversion would result in substantially more 'top weight' that would adversely affect the transverse stability of the vessel but as the quantity of additional weight is not known, the extent to which the stability of the vessel was affected cannot be determined. This conversion was not reported to the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard, as required by section 438(2) of the Canada Shipping Act.

After a full catch of some 25 tons of dogfish, the vessel's lazaret and engine-room was pumped dry and the "WENBROOKE" departed La Perouse Bank at 2000, April 11, 1988, bound for the discharge port of Ucluelet, B.C. After stowing away the fishing gear, the deck-hands checked the lazaret which was found to be dry and returned to the wheel-house for coffee some 15 minutes later. The weather was good with calm winds but as the vessel steamed towards the shore, the swell was becoming short, steep and confused, with a height of about 1 m-1.5 m; the vessel was on autopilot and her speed 6 knots. As the freeboard at the stern was 22 cm, the skipper periodically glanced aft over the stern from his position on the starboard side of the wheel-house. A further 15 minutes had elapsed when the skipper observed that the stern was awash and placed the engine in neutral; but by this time, the sea-level at the stern was coming up to the top of the bulwarks and the stern roller was under water.

The skipper called the F/V "HARVEST MOON TU" on VHF R/T and requested that she stand-by as his vessel was taking on water. A larger wave then came over the stern swamping the after deck, causing the vessel to list to starboard and the water was now reaching the starboard winch. The skipper again called the "HARVEST MOON TU", and requested that a 'MAYDAY' be transmitted on behalf of the "WENBROOKE". Meanwhile, the crew launched the skiff on one side and the liferaft on the other and the vessel was abandoned at about

2030. Shortly thereafter, the "WENBROOKE" capsized and both the liferaft and the skiff moved away from the sinking vessel. Meanwhile, the "HARVEST MOON TU" called Tofino CGRS and apprised them of the situation thus initiating SAR response. Some 45 minutes later, the crew of the "WENBROOKE" were rescued in good health and transported to Ucluelet. At 2200, the search for the vessel valued at $200,000 was abandoned and it was assumed that she sank in position 48°47'N 125°50'W.

The sinking of the vessel precluded any examination. Hence, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it would appear that the ingress of water was possibly due to unsecured cockpit covers and lack of lazaret manhole covers.

Findings

On the evening of April 11, 1988, while returning from the fishing grounds off the west coast of Vancouver Island, in 1-1.5 m swell and with a full load of dogfish, the small fishing vessel "WENBROOKE" capsized and sank due to an ingress of water.

The reason for the ingress of water is not known but of the alternatives, it is considered that the downflooding of the lazaret is the most likely. Accepting this theory then, it would appear that the following were contributory factors:

- the manhole covers to the lazaret were not in place;
- the aluminum covers for the cockpit, sited above the lazaret, were not secured nor designed to be water-tight; and
- the low freeboard aft facilitated water to come on deck aft and drain into the cockpit and thence into the lazaret.

Other Findings

The conversion of the vessel from a troller to a trawler was not reported to the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard as required by Section 438 (2) of the Canada Shipping Act.

The effect of the conversion on the vessel's transverse stability could not be assessed owing to insufficient information.


POSITION OF SINKING
POSITION DE L'ENGLOUTISSEMENT
"WENBROOKE"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3000
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3000 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
USN
VANCOUVER ISLAND
STRAIT OF GEORGIA
JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT
VICTORIA
VANCOUVER
NANAIMO
ALBERNI INLET
Port Alberni
Port Angeles
Barkley Sound
Baynes Sound
Clayoquot Sound
Texada Island
Lasqueti I
Hornby I
Denman I
Gabriola
Valdes I
Galiano I
Mayne I
Saturna I
Pender Is
Salt Spring I
Duncan
Ladysmith
Nanaimo
Courtenay
Comox
Union Bay
Sechelt
Squamish
Woodfibre
Howe Sound
Burrard Inlet
Pt Grey
Boundary Bay
Fraser R
Strait of Georgia
Juan de Fuca Strait
Swiftsure Bank
Pachena Pt
Carmanah Pt
Cape Flattery
Race Rks
Ediz Hook
Dungeness Bay
Sequim
Port San Juan
Esquimalt Hr
Saanich Inlet
Orcas I
San Juan I
Mt Arrowsmith 5962
Mt Benson 5344
Mt Moriarty 5283
Mt Whymper 5056
Mt Grey 4570
Mt Septimus 6300
Mt Tom Taylor 5865
Mt Quimper 4364
Mt Maitland 3907
Mt Frederick 2595
Hannah Mtn 4101
Mt Albert Edward 6870
Golden Hinde Mtn 7219
Alexandra Pk 6500
Mt Mark 3145
Poett Heights 2810
Carmanah Mtn 3515
House Cone 3560
Survey Mtn 3100
Mt Muir 2960
Sooes Mtn 1978
Ellis Mtn 2668
Hoh Hd
Destruction I
Umatilla
Alava
Flattery
Johnson
Juan de Fuca Canyon
Explosives Explosits
PA
Tofino Inlet
Kennedy Lake
Nitinat Lake
Sechelt Inlet
Narrows Inlet
Salmon Inlet
Jervis Inlet
Toba Inlet
Bedwell Sound
Herbert Inlet
Shelter Inlet
Amphitrite Pt
Perouse Bank
Race Passage
Active Pass
Porlier Pass
Boundary Pass
Haro Strait
Ship Pt
Chrome Pt
Sooke
Pt Roberts
Lasqueti I
Texada I
Sechelt 4160
Squamish 4665
Woodfibre 4495
Mt Benson 5344
Mt Arrowsmith 5962
Mt Whymper 5056
Mt Grey 4570
Mt Moriarty 5283
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Alexandra Pk 6500
Mt Mark 3145
Poett Heights 2810
Carmanah Mtn 3515
House Cone 3560
Survey Mtn 3100
Mt Muir 2960
Sooes Mtn 1978
Ellis Mtn 2668
127°
30'
126°
30'
125°
30'
124°
30'
123°
49°
48°

"WENBROOKE"

"LORAINE & I"

Loss overboard of a crew member in Minas Basin, N.S., April 27, 1988.

Summary

The 28 gross ton, 11.6[illegible] m long Canadian dragger "LORAINE & I" is a typical east coast Cape Islander of fibre glass construction with forecastle accommodation. Beneath the wheel-house, which is located slightly forward of amidships, is the engine-room. Aft of the wheel-house is a watertight working deck extending to the transom. A 203 mm wide wash boards on either side of the wheel-house provide access to the forward deck. Grab rails are fitted full length on top of the wheel-house along both the port and starboard sides.

After clearing the fishing gear that had become caught on the seabed in position 45°09.2'N, 64°19.2'W, while the vessel was dragging for flounder in the Minas Basin, the net was hauled in to sort the catch. During this time, the F/V "ANGIE DEREK II" manoeuvred close to the port side of the "LORAINE & I" allowing both crews to converse. There were 2 crew members aboard the "LORAINE & I". At about 0510, the deck-hand on board the "LORAINE & I" proceeded forward along the starboard side of the wheel-house, presumably to retrieve a mooring line hanging from the bow, when he fell overboard.

The reported weather conditions at the time of the accident were SE'ly winds at 10 knots, calm seas, good visibility, air temperature 0°C and sea temperature 5°C.

Attempts to rescue the deck-hand commenced immediately, however, he appeared to be in a state of panic and unable to grab at either a line or lifebuoy that were thrown to him, although both landed well within his reach. Meanwhile, when an attempt was made to manoeuvre the "LORAINE & I" closer to the deck-hand, the fishing gear became entangled in the propeller thus disabling the vessel. In order to avoid a similar occurrence, the "ANGIE DEREK II" was carefully manoeuvred towards the deck-hand without using stern movements.

Two additional lifebuoys and another line were thrown to the deck-hand while a crew member aboard the "ANGIE DEREK II" prepared to enter the water to assist after obtaining and donning a suit of flotation coveralls.

In spite of these efforts, the deck-hand disappeared beneath the surface within an estimated three minutes after falling into the water. He was a non-swimmer but the

pullover-type jacket he was wearing initially provided some buoyancy due to trapped air inside the garment.

The "ANGIE DEREK II" immediately took the "LORAINE & I" in tow and searched the surrounding area for the deck-hand without success; then at 0530 contacted Yarmouth Coast Guard Radio and advised them of the situation, thus initiating official SAR response.

Despite search efforts the body of the victim was not found. Later on May 20, 1988, a body, later identified to be that of the victim, was found near Greenwich, N.S.

Findings

During the early morning of April 27, 1988, in good weather conditions, the deck-hand serving on board the "LORAINE & I" fell into the water and drowned while apparently proceeding towards the forward deck to retrieve a mooring line hanging over the side.

It would appear the following may have contributed to the accident:

- the deck-hand either slipped or stumbled while proceeding forward, then fell into the water;
- the deck-hand appeared panic-striken and was unable to help himself or grab at the lines or lifebuoys that were thrown to him;
- rescue efforts were hampered by one vessel becoming disabled and the other with restricted manoeuvrability;
- the deck-hand was not wearing any type of a personal flotation device and was unable to swim; and
- the cold water would have induced some degree of immediate body shock.


POSITION OF VESSEL WHERE CREWMAN FELL OVERBOARD
POSITION DU NAVIRE À LAQUELLE LE MEMBRE D'ÉQUIPAGE EST TOMBÉ PAR-DESSUS BORD
"LORRAINE & I"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4010
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4010 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
MINAS BASIN
Scots Bay
Cape Split
Cape Blomidon
Parrsboro
Cape Sharp
Black Rock
Baxters Harbour
Long Beach
Glenmont
Upper Canard
Kingsport
Canning
Port Williams
Aldershot
Greenwich
Wolfville
Grand Pré
Kentville
Longspell Pt.
Long Island Hd.
Porter Pt.
Starrs Pt.
Blomidon
Bennett Run
Scots Bay
Split Rock
Brambor
Cheverie Pt.
Indian Pt.
Kempt Shore
Summerville
Lower Burlington
Cambridge
Pembroke
Stuhbourn Hd.
Walton
Walton Bar
The Hogsback
Flats
Oak Hill
Gerrish Mountain
Lower Economy
Red Hd.
White Rock
Brick Kilns Ledges
Chart 4399
Chart 4140
Chart 4130
Fog Sig
Ra
Bell
Fl R
Fl G
Fl W
Oc (2) 20s 80ft 12M
Oc W R G 10s 80ft 12M
Oc R 10s 80ft 12M
Oc (2) 20s 80ft 12M
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
FREDERICTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
45°
20'
10'
30'
20'
10'
64° 00'
5930-Y-30700

"LORRAINE & I"

CFV No. 097959

Loss overboard of the operator off O'Donnell's, St. Mary's Bay, Nfld., May 7, 1988.

Summary

The 1.93 gross ton, 5.18 m long, flat-bottomed open speed boat CFV No. 097959 was constructed of wood and powered by a 30 h.p. outboard motor. The boat was manned by a single person and the lobster fishing licence for the vessel had not been renewed for the 1988 season. Generally, the operator, Mr. Parrott, was known to be a safety-minded individual but, for reasons unknown, there was neither a lifejacket nor a lifebuoy aboard his boat at the time of the casualty. Thus, the vessel did not meet her obligation with respect to the carriage of the life-saving equipment under the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations.

Mr. Parrott departed O'Donnell's wharf, Nfld. at 0630, May 7, 1988 to tend to his lobster pots which had been set earlier in the season. The weather was Southerly winds at 3-5 knots, with rippled sea and clear visibility. After tending to his lobster pots, he was observed returning to the wharf by two crew members from another longliner. At 0855, with Mr. Parrott standing near the stern of the boat and with the motor at full open throttle, the vessel approached to within 50 m off the head of the wharf when, for no apparent reason, the boat suddenly sheared off to port and Mr. Parrott was seen falling overboard.

The crew of the longliner which was secured alongside the wharf rushed to their vessel and immediately launched the dory. As the dory was being rowed towards the victim in the water, he was heard calling out for help but before the dory could reach him, he sank beneath the surface. Mr. Parrott was known to be a swimmer. The weigh master, stationed ashore, on observing the mishap immediately contacted Placentia VTS and requested that they notify the RCMP. Arrangements were made for the divers, and when they arrived on scene, they, in the presence of the RCMP, recovered the victim's body by 1330. The body was then transported to the Health Sciences Complex in St. John's, Nfld.

An autopsy determined the cause of death to be due to drowning in seawater. A test for blood-alcohol content showed that the victim had 70 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood (70 MGM %) which is slightly below the 80 MGM % legal limit for operating a vessel in Canada.

Findings

The lone operator of the flat-bottomed 5.18 m wooden boat powered by a 30 h.p. outboard motor was lost overboard and drowned when he fell into the icy-cold waters whilst approaching the wharf at O'Connell's, St. Mary's Bay, Newfoundland on the morning of May 7, 1988. It would appear that the following factors contributed to his fall overboard:

- the boat sheared suddenly to port for some unknown reason; and

- the victim was standing at the stern of his boat.

Following his fall in the water, Mr. Parrott lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- the victim did not wear any form of a flotation device; and

- the cold seawater temperature limited the victim's survival time.

Other Findings

The vessel, in neither carrying a lifejacket nor a lifebuoy, did not meet her obligation with respect to the carriage of life-saving equipment of the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations.

The lobster fishing licence had expired and had not been renewed for the 1988 fishing season.

The victim had consumed some alcohol.


Bushy Head
CORNER BROOK
GANDER
CHANNEL PORT AUX BASQUES
ST JOHN'S
Harricott Pt
Pinch Pt
Fraser Pt
Mitchells Brook
SALMON
St Joseph's
Salmonier Pt
St Josephs Pond
Mussel Pond Pt
See NOTE/Voir NOTE
O'Donnells
Mussel Pond
Mussel Pond Cove
AREA OF DROWNING
LIEU DE LA NOYADE
Voir cartouche
Salmon Brook
Shoal Bay River
Shoal Bay Pond
Bay Brook
"CFV 097959"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4843
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4853 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
47°
53°35'

Open boat from which victim fell.
Embarcation non-pontée de laquelle la victime est tombée.

Approximate position of drowning.
La position approximative de la noyade.



Long-liner dory used in rescue attempt.
Doris de palangrier utilisé dans la tentative de sauvetage.

"KARINE G"/"GLOUCESTER No. 31"

Collision in Gulf of St. Lawrence, May 12, 1988.

Summary

Gloucester No. 31"

After recovering her crab traps, the 43 gross ton, 17.31 m long Canadian crabber "GLOUCESTER No. 31" departed Banc de l'Orphelin at about 0500, May 12, 1988, bound for Banc Bradelle. The weather was overcast with fog reducing the visibility to near-zero at times, southerly winds were light and the sea was calm. In the wheel-house, were the skipper who had the conduct of the vessel and a deck-hand at the helm while four crew members were resting in the accommodation. The vessel was steering a course of 200°(M) and her speed was about 4 knots. The skipper, who was monitoring the radar on 6-mile range, noticed a number of fishing vessels in the area. As all of them were over a mile away, he did not pay attention to any one in particular. He was of the opinion that the other vessels were also engaged in hauling in their traps or moving between them.

Before leaving the bridge to relieve himself at about 0520, the skipper informed the deck-hand at the wheel to be careful of the approaching traffic but did not specify from what direction. No look-out was posted and no fog signals sounded. The deck-hand neither saw any vessels nor any lights and, some 5 minutes later, the vessel was involved in a collision with the "KARINE G", sustaining significant damage.

"KARINE G"

The 75 gross ton, 18.29 m long Canadian crabber "KARINE G" departed Lamèque, N.B., at 1800, May 11, 1988 bound for Banc de L'Orphelin fishing grounds. The crew of 5 commenced hauling in the crab traps and, upon completion at 0520, the skipper sent all of his crew on coffee break whilst the vessel was proceeding to another location. The vessel's course was set to ESE on auto-pilot and her speed was 7 to 8 knots. The skipper, who was alone on the bridge, was monitoring the radar on the 6-mile range. He found that there were fishing vessels at ranges of more than one mile. At about 0525, the skipper leaned out of the wheel-house window and saw a vessel, later identified to be the "GLOUCESTER No. 31", emerging out of the fog on his port bow. The engine was placed 'full astern' but both vessels collided when the bow of the "KARINE G" penetrated by nearly a meter into the starboard side of "GLOUCESTER No. 31"; the "KARINE G" appeared unscathed.

Events following collision

After the collision, both vessels drifted apart. The "GLOUCESTER No. 31" commenced taking water in the bow section through the broken shipside planking. All pumps were activated to keep the vessel afloat and a radio message transmitted seeking assistance. Both vessels exchanged information and the "KARINE G" stoodby the "GLOUCESTER No. 31". CGRS Fox River was informed and RCC Halifax notified, thus initiating official SAR response. Additional pumps from SAR resources were placed aboard the "GLOUCESTER No. 31", the water pumped out and a temporary patch applied. The vessel was then escorted to Shippagan where she was hauled up the slip, and repairs effected at a cost of about $96,000.

Findings

The collision between the two fishing vessels "KARINE G" and "GLOUCESTER No. 31 on May 12, 1988 in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in poor visibility and during daybreak was due to both vessels not observing certain provisions of the Collision Regulations.

It would appear that following factors contributed to the collision:

Both Vessels

- by not maintaining a 'proper look-out', they did not meet their obligation under Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations;

- by not making proper use of the radar to establish if risk of collision existed, they did not meet their obligation under Rule 7 of the Collision Regulations; and

- by not sounding fog signals in poor visibility, they did not meet their obligation under Rule 35 of the Collision Regulations.

"KARINE G"

- in proceeding at a full speed of 8 knots in poor visibility, she did not meet her obligation to proceed at a safe speed under Rule 6 of the Collision Regulations; and

- contrary to the dictates of good seamanship, she was being steered by autopilot in poor visibility.



"KARINE G"/"GLOUCESTER No. 31"

REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4002	SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4002 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS	PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

The "GLOUCESTER No 31" hauled-in on service slips for fishing vessels in Shippegan, New Brunswick.

Le "GLOUCESTER No 31" hâlé sur des slips de service pour bateau de pêche à Shippegan (N.-B.).



The "KARINE G" on service slips for fishing vessels in Shippegan, New Brunswick.

Le "KARINE G" sur des slips de service pour bateau de pêche à Shippegan (N.-B.).

"SEACO"

Explosion on board with loss of vessel, Campobello Island, N.B., May 18, 1988.

Summary

Since October 1987, the 74 gross ton, wooden Canadian fishing vessel "SEACO" was secured alongside Head Harbour Wharf, Campobello Island, N.B. carrying out various maintenance. Some 2 weeks prior to the explosion, an original propane gas unit had been removed and the propane cylinder valves, reportedly, had been tightly closed but, after the explosion, one cylinder valve was found open 1½ turns. The gas fitting on the end of the line leading to the stove had not been plugged, and it was not known if a valve fitted to the end of the gas line to the stove was open or closed. Some smoking and various maintenance involving use of electrical equipment had been carried out prior to the explosion. A second replacement galley stove was obtained but had not been connected to the propane gas supply.

On May 18, 1988, the crew were working ashore on the seine net while the skipper proceeded aboard the vessel to the forecastle area. He did not smell any propane. Between 0930 and 1030 the skipper sanded woodwork, vacuumed the surface clean and applied a second coat of varnish to the bunk. He then stood at the foot of the companionway contemplating on the next project when an explosion occurred in the forecastle.

The skipper hung tightly onto the ladder and during this time felt the ladder break, then saw that the forward deck had been blown away by the force of the explosion. He could hear water rushing into the forecastle and the "SEACO" began to sink beneath him; the skipper swam upwards, surfacing among the debris.

The explosion which sounded similar to a dynamite blast attracted attention of fishermen ashore and onboard other vessels. When the skipper surfaced, lines and lifebuoys were thrown towards him. Meanwhile, some fishermen boarded a motor-powered skiff and proceed towards the skipper in the water. Within minutes the skipper was rescued, brought ashore and transported to a hospital in an ambulance. The skipper suffered second degree burns to both arms, along with a cracked disk and a fracture to his left leg.

Appropriate action by the aquaculture facility located at Head Harbour and the Coast Guard Marine Emergency team to contain fuel leaking from the sunken vessel prevented damage to the salmon stock/environment; this included hauling the

vessel up on the beach.

Subsequently, the vessel was inspected and declared a constructive total loss. Her replacement value was about 1.3 million dollars but she was insured for considerably less.

Findings

An explosion occurred aboard the Canadian fishing vessel "SEACO" resulting in her sinking alongside the quay at Head Harbour wharf, Campobello Island, N.B. on May 18, 1988, causing serious injuries to her skipper and the vessel to be declared a constructive total loss.

Although the exact cause of the explosion on board the "SEACO" cannot be established, it would appear the following contributed to this casualty:

- a propane stove was disconnected from its gas supply and removed from the forecastle;
- gas supply lines to the appliance were not plugged or disconnected at the cylinder;
- a propane gas leak occurred over an unknown period;
- propane gas accummulated in the lower level of the forecastle;
- an explosive mixture of air and propane gas was created as work was being carried out in the forecastle; and
- this explosive propane gas and air mixture was ignited by either a spark from the thermostatic switch fitted to an electric heater, or possibly the lighting of a cigarette.

Other Findings

The "SEACO" sank rapidly due to an ingress of water through openings in the fish-hold and engine-room bulkheads.

The actions of local divers and the Canadian Coast Guard Emergency Team contained a large amount of the pollutants on board the vessel and prevented possible losses to the aquaculture facility.


CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
FREDERICTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
Leonardville Harbour
Public Fish Pier
Spruce I
44°58'N
Black Rock
Casco Bay I
Halfside Ledge
PASSAGE
Head Harbour
Head Harbour I
Public Pier
Canadian Seafoods Tanks
Mill Cove Pt
Popes I
Popes Shoal
4P
HARBOUR
Wilsons Beach
Windmill Pt
Public Pier
Mill Cove Pond
Scott Hd
Otter Cove
Harbour Lake
Stovers Ledge
North Road
Bald Head
Conroy Cove
Gilhgan Pt
Dunbar Hill
HEAD
NECK
66°57'W
POSITION WHEN EXPLOSION OCCURED AND VESSEL SANK
POSITION AU MOMENT OÙ L'EXPLOSION S'EST PRODUITE ET LE NAVIRE A COULÉ
"SEACO"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4373
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4373 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

"SEACO" at Head Harbour, New Brunswick.
"SEACO" à Head Harbour (N.-B.).

"SEACO", oil boom deployed.
"SEACO", estacade pour le mazout déployée.

"CAPE TREVOR"

Loss of vessel with loss of one life, off Jeddore Head, N.S., June 9, 1988.

Summary

The 8.2 long, 6 gross ton "CAPE TREVOR" was a typical Cape Island-type inshore fishing vessel with an enclosed cabin and wheel-house forward and an open deck area aft, part of which was enclosed to form the winter house. Reportedly, the winter house was in a poor overall condition.

The vessel, with only the owner/operator on board, departed West Jeddore, N.S. between 0400 and 0430, June 9, 1988. After hauling mackerel nets, the vessel proceeded close inshore off Jeddore Head and commenced hauling lobster traps. The weather that morning was clear and the seas calm with a slight swell. Winds were also calm early in the morning becoming light south-westerly in the afternoon. At 1045, a small fisheries research boat came alongside the "CAPE TREVOR" and everything appeared normal. Also, the last vessel to sight the "CAPE TREVOR" passed her at about 1130, some ½ mile offshore from her, and nothing unusual was noticed. At about 1300 another fishing vessel at the approaches to Jeddore Harbour did not notice any vessels to seaward off Jeddore Head. This would probably indicate that the casualty occurred between 1130 and 1300.

At about 1650, the operator's wife, being unable to raise her husband on the radio, raised the alarm thus initiating SAR response. The vessel was first found on the shoreline by Jeddore Cliff by two people who were walking through the woods. The operator was found close astern of the boat lying face down at the water's edge with no sign of life. RCMP was notified and a doctor summoned. The body was then recovered and transported to East Jeddore.

When found, the winter house of "CAPE TREVOR" was completely off the boat, although the roof, with radar scanner, antenna and hauling boom were lying overside but still attached to the vessel by cables. On June 10, the vessel's anchor and anchor rope was found in about 3 to 4 fathoms (5.5 - 7.3 m) of water. The engine was retrieved from the wreckage and test run and no defects were noted. Indications were that the engine may still have been running when the boat grounded.

An autopsy, later performed, showed that the operator of the "CAPE TREVOR" died as a result of drowning by accident. The boat was considered to be a constructive total loss and had an insured value of $19,000.

Findings

It is possible that the single operator of the "CAPE TREVOR" fell overboard, under good weather conditions, and drowned. The precise reason for his falling overboard is not known but of the various options one of the following occurrences would seem to be the most likely:

- the winter house, which was reported to be in poor condition, may have collapsed while hauling in or endeavouring to free a lobster trap, causing him to fall overboard;

- while endeavouring to fetch or use the anchor, either for anchoring purposes or to free a lobster trap, the operator may have lost his footing or balance and fallen overboard; or

- while performing fishing or other duties, he may have accidently fallen overboard.

The following may also have contributed to the drowning:

- he wore no form of a personal flotation device;

- the vessel was not provided with any 'emergency means' that could have assisted the single operator in climbing back aboard; and

- the water temperature was such that the operator would quickly lose his ability to save himself.

Once unmanned, the vessel then drifted ashore and eventually broke up.

Other Findings

The operator did not hold a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (Maritime) as required by Sections 78 and 88 of the General Radio Regulations (Part II) made pursuant to the Radio Act.

The VHF radiotelephone aboard the "CAPE TREVOR" was not licensed as required by the Radio Act.

In not carrying a lifebuoy aboard the vessel, she did not meet her obligation with respect to the carriage of life-saving equipment under the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations.



"CAPE TREVOR"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4347	SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4347 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS	PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES



Bow section of the "CAPE TREVOR" as viewed on June 12,1988.

Partie avant du "Cape Trevor" comme on a pu le voir le 12 juin,1988.

Stern section of the "CAPE TREVOR" as viewed on June 12,1988. Note broken spanker boom.

Partie arrière du "Cape Trevor" comme on a pu le voir le 12juin,1988. Remarquez la bôme de brigantine cassée.

"WILLIAM SHAWN"

Sinking in Trinity Bay, Nfld., June 16, 1988.

Summary

The 29 gross ton, Newfoundland-style longliner "WILLIAM SHAWN" was divided below the main deck into 4 compartments comprising a forecastle/accommodation/galley, a wheel-house forward of midship above the engine-room, a fish hold and a lazaret.

After a catch of some 9,000 kg of capelin from the Baccalieu Tickle fishing grounds had been loaded aboard the "WILLIAM SHAWN", she commenced her return voyage to Old Perlican on the evening of June 15, 1988. At about 2330, while en route, a good school of fish was observed on the fish finder and a further 9,000-10,000 kg of capelin from the pursed-in net was loaded aboard the vessel. The total load now being 19,000 kg. The vessel then proceeded at 7-8 knots on a WSW course, keeping 1 mile offshore and headed for the Perlican fairway buoy. The helmsman suddenly noticed that the vessel was heavily trimmed by the stern and water was gaining access on deck through her scuppers (freeing ports). The skipper, then in the forecastle, was alerted and the situation assessed. Winds were SW at 5 knots, 0.3 m to 0.6 m sea swell and visibility 4-5 miles. Attempts were made to pump out water that may have collected in the fish hold but with little success possibly due to the pump suctions becoming fouled with the small fish. Her after deck had become awash and fearing that the vessel would sink, the skipper transmitted a 'MAYDAY'. The crew then abandoned the vessel into the seine skiff, moved clear of the vessel and watched as the vessel settled by the stern. The crew were rescued by another fishing vessel and when attempts to salvage the vessel failed, the vessel sank.

As her fish hold was divided into 3 longitudinal pens to facilitate loading and, as no transverse penboards were fitted, a free movement of load in the longitudinal direction permitted additional stresses on the forward and aft fish hold bulkheads. This resulted in partial or total collapse of the latter. The load then shifted to the lazaret further trimming the vessel by the stern and permitting water to gain access to the deck. The water eventually downflooded through her main hatch until the vessel sank stern first.

There were no injuries and no pollution was evident. Typical resale value of the vessel of her size and type would be in the order of $75,000 to $100,000.

Findings

While enroute from the fishing grounds in good weather conditions early on the morning of June 16, 1988, with a load of about 19,000 kg of capelin in her longitudinally penned-off fish hold, the "WILLIAM SHAWN" suddenly lost freeboard aft and began to ship water on deck; she subsequently flooded and sank some hours later. It would appear that the following factors contributed to her loss:

- the vessel was deeply laden as she began her return voyage;
- the transverse penboards were not fitted permitting excessive weight to bear on the fish hold/lazaret bulkhead, leading to its probable collapse;
- the non-fitting of transverse penboards permitted the whole catch to suddenly shift its weight aft, trimming the vessel heavily by the stern;
- the loss of freeboard aft permitted seawater to gain access to the deck through her scuppers, further reducing the after freeboard;
- the resultant excessive trim by the stern resulted in a reduction of reserve buoyancy aft; and
- there was insufficient time to permit the crew to attempt jettisoning either the seine or the fish.

Other Findings

The distress message was not transmitted on the appropriate distress frequency.

TYPICAL OF "WILLIAM SHAWN"

CARACTÉRISTIQUES DU "WILLIAM SHAWN"





BEGAN FISHING / DÉBUT DE LA PÊCHE

APPROXIMATE POSITION OF LOSS / POSITION APPROXIMATIVE DU SINISTRE

48°10'N

53°00'W

"WILLIAM SHAWN"

REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4563 / SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4563 DU SHC

DEPTH IN FATHOMS / PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

"CONCEPTION STAR"

Swamping and capsizing off Lower Island Cove, Conception Bay, Nfld., June 17, 1988.

Summary

The 20 gross ton "CONCEPTION STAR" is a typical Newfoundland-style longliner divided into 4 compartments below the main deck, as follows: the accommodation/galley forward, followed by the engine-room, the fish hold and lazaret. The fish hold was divided into 9 pens but the penboards were not used as designed. The SIC 29 certificate was stamped "not approved for herring or capelin fishing". There was no direct bilge suction to the lazaret and no specific means provided for drainage from that space.

On June 17, 1988, the "CONCEPTION STAR", fished off Bay de Verde, Conception Bay. By 1730, she had loaded a catch of some 18,000 kg of capelin into her hold which had been penned out in such a manner that the forward 6 pens would be filled to 80% capacity before the catch loaded in the fish hold could spill over into the after 3 penned areas, by leaving out certain portable penboards (see sketch).

After refuelling at Bay de Verde and in south-east winds at 5 knots, 0.5 m sea swell and 10 mile visibility, she began her 5-hour return voyage accompanied by fishing vessel "LAKESHORE VENTURE". At 2020, about 40 minutes into the voyage, when about one mile off Lower Island Cove, it was noticed aboard the "CONCEPTION STAR" that water was gaining access on deck and that the vessel was heavy astern. As there was no noticeable change in the amount of water in the engine-room bilge, a portable pump was moved aft on deck and put into operation in an effort to remove water accumulating on the afterdeck. The "LAKESHORE VENTURE" was alerted.

Before the gas pump effectively reduced the water on deck, a spray-back from its discharge caused it to stall and rendered it inoperable. By that time it was feared that the "CONCEPTION STAR" would sink and her crew of 4 abandoned the vessel in the tow-off skiff. Her stern then submerged and suddenly the vessel rolled over to starboard.

The "LAKESHORE VENTURE" rescued the crew of the "CONCEPTION STAR" and reported the incident to St. John's Coast Guard Radio Station at 2237. The following day, the overturned vessel was located and towed to Harbour Grace where she was successfully uprighted and refloated. Repairs were completed and the vessel returned to service.

On a subsequent voyage it was noticed that a lock nut

had backed off on the rudder stuffing box and consequently the nut it had been locking had also slackened permitting an ingress of water. Both nuts were tightened and the ingress stopped. It is probable those nuts had been backed off prior to the casualty resulting in the lazaret flooding. In the light condition, the area of the leak about the nuts would likely be at or above the waterline and thus not noticed during inspection for probable cause after the casualty.

There were no injuries nor any recorded pollution as a result of this casualty. The loss of her fish cargo and repairs to the vessel represented a cost in the order of $50,000.

Findings

The small Canadian wooden fishing vessel "CONCEPTION STAR" while returning from the fishing grounds loaded with capelin, took on water in good weather conditions and capsized June 17, 1988 off Lower Island Cove, Conception Bay, Nfld. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the casualty:

- the vessel was deeply laden as she began her return voyage;

- a probable leak at the rudder stuffing box, caused by the locking nut and other securing nut backing off, flooded the lazaret;

- there was no direct means to pump out the water from that compartment, contrary to the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations;

- the subsequent loss of freeboard aft permitted access of water on deck through her scuppers further reducing freeboard; and

- there was insufficient time for the crew to attempt jettisoning either the seine net or fish.

Other Findings

The vessel had no approved stability data for operation in the herring or capelin fishery as required by the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations.


"CONCEPTION STAR"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4563
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4563 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
TRACK SILLAGE
VESSEL AT TIME OF CASUALTY JUNE 17, 1988
LE NAVIRE AU MOMENT DE SINISTRE LE 17 JUIN 1988
See CAUTION No 1
CORNER BROOK
GANDER
CHANNEL PORT AUX BASQUES
ST JOHN'S
Adjoining Chart 1565
- 50 -

"CONCEPTION STAR" after casualty.

"CONCEPTION STAR" après le sinistre.

THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE PENBOARDS WERE SUCH THAT THE FISH WHEN LOADED INTO SECTION 5 WOULD BE PERMITTED TO FLOW INTO SECTIONS 1,2,3,4 AND 6. WHEN FISH IN SECTIONS 1,2,3,4,5 AND 6 HAS REACHED THIS LEVEL, FISH THEN FLOWS INTO SECTIONS 7,8 AND 9.

LA DISPOSITION DES PLANCHES DE SÉPARATION ÉTAIT TELLE QUE LE POISSON, LORSQU'IL ÉTAIT CHARGÉ DANS LE COMPARTIMENT 5, POUVAIT SE DÉVERSER DANS LES COMPARTIMENTS 1,2,3,4 ET 6. LORSQUE LE POISSON DANS LES COMPARTIMENTS 1,2,3,4,5 ET 6 A ATTEINT CE NIVEAU, LE POISSON SE DEVERSE ENSUITE DANS LES COMPARTIMENTS 7,8 ET 9.

"CONCEPTION STAR"

LOADING ARRANGEMENT

PLAN DE CHARGEMENT



"RITA & PAUL"

Fire and subsequent sinking off Furby's Cove, Hermitage Bay, Nfld., June 21, 1988.

Summary

The 13.88 gross ton, 12.2 m long "RITA & PAUL" was a typical Newfoundland small wooden longliner with the accommodation forward, the wheel-house forward of midship, the engine underneath the wheel-house and the fish hold aft. The vessel was equipped with a diesel stove for heating and a two-burner propane stove for cooking.

On June 21, 1988, at 1800, the vessel departed Grand Bank with two persons on board bound for a fishing ground in Hermitage Bay. In a position about 2 miles east of Furby's Cove, Hermitage Bay, the "RITA & PAUL" was steaming on an easterly heading at a speed of approximately 8 knots. The operator briefly left the wheel-house for the accommodation, forward, to put the kettle on the propane stove. At about 2330, an explosion and flash fire occurred while the operator lit a match to light the stove. The fire spread quickly and the two men abandoned the vessel into a dory. There was no attempt made at either transmitting a distress message or putting out the fire.

Weather conditions were mist with reduced visibility to 3 miles, southerly wind at 8 knots, calm sea and air temperature +12°C.

Prior to abandoning the vessel, the operator was able to salvage the VHF radio and Loran C. While the 2 men were in the dory, the fire appeared diminished and the operator reboarded the "RITA & PAUL". Upon opening the wheel-house door, he found the area filled with smoke and fire. He escaped the burning vessel into the dory and both men rowed for about one and a half hours until they safely reached Furby's Cove and received assistance from other fishermen. The Coast Guard was then advised of the incident.

Assistance was sought from another fishing vessel "PAMELA MICHELLE" and search for the "RITA & PAUL" commenced. No trace of the "RITA & PAUL" was found and the vessel valued at about $140,000 is presumed to have sunk.

Findings

A propane gas-fuel explosion and a flash fire occurred on board the small fishing vessel "RITA & PAUL" at night on June 21, 1988, in good weather conditions resulting in the

vessel sinking in an undetermined position in Hermitage Bay, Nfld., with no injuries or loss of life.

The explosion was caused by a lighted match igniting propane gas which had leaked in the forward cabin creating an ignitable gas-air mixture. As the sinking of the vessel precluded her inspection, the precise cause for the gas leak could not be determined. Hence, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it would appear that the following factors may have contributed to this casualty:

- gas escaping through a fracture in the propane gas fuel line, within the accommodation; or

- the fitting between the main line and the stove manifold pipe became loose, permitting gas to escape into the accommodation;

- the practice of always leaving the gas cylinder valve open without the installation of a pressure gauge and without periodic testing allowed the propane gas to escape undetected; and

- the poor ventilation to the space housing the gas stove allowed escaped gas to accumulate.

Other Findings

The "RITA & PAUL", being a motor-driven vessel under 15 gross tons, was not required to comply with the Liquid Petroleum Gas Regulations.

Gas detectors for the marine environment are commercially available and in use by various types of vessel which carry LPG appliances, but the vessel was not equipped with one.

No distress message was transmitted and rudimentary abandonment procedures were not undertaken.

No attempt was made to fight the fire using fire-fighting equipment on board nor was the propane cutlet valve at the cylinder closed after the commencement of the fire.

"RITA AND PAUL"



SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

CROQUIS N'EST PAS À L'ÉCHELLE


CORNER BROOK
GANDER
CHANNEL PORT AUX BASQUES
ST JOHN'S
GARRISON HILLS
POSITION OF "RITA AND PAUL" AT TIME OF EXPLOSION
POSITION DU "RITA AND PAUL" AU MOMENT DE L'EXPLOSION
47° 40
55° 50'
45'
Continued on inset
"RITA AND PAUL"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4644
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4644 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

"LONE FISHER"

Capsizing off Northern Head, Bay of Exploits, Nfld., June 26, 1988.

Summary

The "LONE FISHER", a 23 gross ton wooden fishing vessel was built in 1972 and registered in St. John's, Nfld. Typical of the Newfoundland-style longliner/gillnetter, she was rigged for seining operation. Below the main deck, the vessel was subdivided into 4 compartments by 3 transverse bulkheads as follows: the galley/crew accommodations forward, followed by the engine-room, fish hold and the lazaret. Her fish hold was fitted to receive longitudinal and transverse penboards to form 9 compartments but the penboards were not used as designed.

The "LONE FISHER", with the skipper/owner and 4 crew members on board, departed Comfort Cove, Bay of Exploits, Nfld. at 0500, June 26, 1988, bound for the fishing grounds off Northern Head. The winds were southerly at 5 knots, calm seas and 5 miles visibility. A school of fish was located by 0800 and the seine shot away. When pursed-in on her starboard side, an estimated catch of 18,000-22,000 kg of capelin was entrapped. As the process of drying up the catch and loading it on board began, it was realized that a strong northerly ebb tide of about 2 knots was setting the vessel towards shallower waters. Her anchor was thus let go and the vessel held in position some 500 m off Northern Head.

Utilizing a dip net rigged from a boom and winch, the catch was transferred from the seine to the fish hold. Each time the dip net was raised to be swung inboard, a starboard list from the weight of the pursed-in catch and seine would increase slightly until the 150-200 kg weight in the dip net was released into the hold. A rolling period thus developed. In the meantime, the loading arrangement in the hold was such that only the starboard penboards were fitted thus forming 2 compartments in 1/3-2/3 ratio. As the penboards extended from the flooring to within 20 cm of the deck-head, the centre and port compartments would have to be within 80% full before the catch released in the fish hold could flow over into the starboard compartment. Thus, the list to starboard from the weight of the pursed-in catch attached to the starboard rail and suspended from the power block, could be offset as the weight in the seine decreased and the weight in the hold increased.

By about 0910, some 3700 kg had been transferred from the seine to the hold. Shortly afterwards, as another dip was being raised, the list increased more than normal until

her deck edge was submerged. Realizing that she would not right herself, those on board hurried to the port side as the vessel capsized and climbed over the rails and onto her side and bottom, from where they hauled the tow-off skiff alongside and safely boarded it. There had been no time to take any preventative action nor to equip themselves with any of the lifejackets available.

Other vessels in the area who saw the "LONE FISHER" capsize, discontinued their fishing operation, notified CGRS Comfort Cove and proceeded to assist and rescued the crew. The vessel was eventually salvaged and towed by CCGV "HOOD" to the Marine Service Centre at Durrell's, Nfld., where she was uprighted. The loss of her fish cargo and subsequent repairs to the vessel represented a cost in the order of $75,000. There were no injuries resulting from this casualty and pollution was minor.

Findings

The "LONE FISHER", while loading capelin from her pursed-alongside seine, in good weather conditions off Northern Head, Bay of Exploits, Newfoundland on June 26, 1988, heeled heavily to starboard and capsized as a result of having insufficient reserve transverse stability to withstand the dynamic heeling forces imposed upon her.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the capsizing:

- she was initially heeled out to starboard due to the weight of the pursed-in catch alongside and secured to her starboard side while suspended from the power block;

- the failure to effectively pen the catch in the hold, which was designed for nine compartments but only fitted with the starboard side longitudinal pen boards, resulted in a virtual loss of GM due to the free surface effect of the catch in the hold;

- the suspension height, weight and rolling motion created by the transfer of the catch to the hold further aggravated the situation;

- the heeling effect of the 'dried-up' net weight suspended from the power block increased as the tide tended to separate the seine from the vessel; and

- downflooding through the open fish hold hatch eliminated the vessel's ability to recover.


55°10'W
49°
33'
N
POSITION VESSEL CAPSIZED
POSITION OÙ LE NAVIRE A CHAVIRÉ
GANDER
ST JOHN'S
"LONE FISHER"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4595
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4595 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
BAY OF EXPLOITS



"LONE FISHER" being lifted from water after recovery.
"LONE FISHER" sorti de l'eau après sa récupération.

"FORREST GLEN"

Accident to crew member while scallop-fishing at sea, July 6, 1988.

Summary

The 90 m long, 164 gross ton "FORREST GLEN" is a wooden scallop dragger with raised forecastle, aft accommodation and fish hold amidships.

Fishing operation is carried out by towing two steel rakes along the seabed by means of steel wire cables called warps. A warp is lead through a block at the head of the gallows which is located on the main deck, forward. From there, the warp is lead through lead blocks on deck, one at the foot of the gallows and the other, inboard, close to the centreline of the vessel, and thence to the winch drum located forward of the aft superstructure.

The vessel departed Lunenburg, N.S. on July 2, 1988 and upon arrival at Georges Bank fishing grounds the following morning, commenced fishing on July 4. As a part of the hauling-in procedures the vessel's whistle was sounded. This was the signal for the warping winches to be clutched in by the winchman and for all personnel to stay clear of the deck. At 0640, as the two scallop rakes were being hauled from the seabed, the deck-hand, who became the victim, walked up the deck on the starboard side in order to pick up the last of scallops which had been retrieved from the previous haul.

The basket of scallops was forward of the warp which crossed the starboard side of the deck. When the deck-hand leaned over the wire, first his apron and then his lower left leg was drawn into the block. His call of alarm alerted the skipper who was in the wheel-house and he stopped the main engine thereby stopping the hydraulically operated winches.

All fishing operations were immediately suspended and while of the crew attended to the injured man, the master reported the accident to a Canadian Coast Guard Radio Station (CCGRS) and requested medical aid.

The CCGRS relayed the information to a local hospital and a doctor advised the vessel of the appropriate first aid care. They also notified the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) at Halifax, N.S. RCC tasked a fixed wing aircraft and a helicopter from Canadian Armed Forces Base Summerside, P.E.I. SARTECHS, who are also trained paramedics, parachuted into the sea close to the "FORREST GLEN". A boat was used to pick up the SARTECHS and their equipment from the sea and

they boarded the "FORREST GLEN" at 0925 rendering assistance to the victim. The helicopter arrived on scene at 1215 and the victim was transported to hospital in Halifax, N.S.

The extent of the injury necessitated the amputation of the lower left leg.

Findings

While fishing for scallops in good weather conditions and during daylight hours, the loose clothing of a crew member of the "FOREST GLEN" became caught in the fishing gear resulting in the loss of his lower left leg.

It would appear that the accident occurred due to the following contributory factors:

- the victim worked in the area of the fishing warp while it was running, contrary to the ship's accepted safe working practices; and

- the victim wore clothing not intended for use while working on deck, contrary to the ship's accepted safe working practices.

Other Findings

The victim had worked at fishing other than scallop fishing, which was very different in nature, for 15 months prior to the accident and it is possible that his awareness of the dangers of scallop fishing had been reduced.

Instructions to the crew to conform with safe working practices was given verbally and not reinforced by written instructions.


"FORREST GLEN"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4003
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4003
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
BAY OF FUNDY
NOVA SCOTIA
44°00'N
ROSEWAY BANK
LAHAVE BANK
BACCARO BANK
BROWNS BANK
CHANNEL
42°00'N
66°00'W
VESSEL POSITION AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
POSITION DU NAVIRE AU MOMENT DE L'ACCIDENT
NEW BRUNSWICK
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
MONCTON
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH

"FORREST GLEN"



Position of the victim immediately before the accident as he began to lean over the board and warp.
Note: The warp is slack and not in use.

Position de la victime immédiatement avant l'accident, au moment où il a commencé à se pencher par-dessus le panneau et la fune.
Remarque: La fune est lâche et n'est pas utlisée.



Starboard side deck arrangement
aboard the "FORREST GLEN" as
viewed from aft.
Note: The arrows represent the direction
in which the warp moves when
the rake is being hauled in.

Vue d'ensemble du pont à tribord
du "FORREST GLEN", tel qu'on peut
le voir de l'arrière.
Nota: Les flèches indiquent la direction
dans lequelle la fune se déplace
lorsque le rateau est remonté.

"GREYHOUND"

Loss overboard of a crew member between Race Rocks and Albert Head, B.C., September 27, 1988.

Summary

The 1968-built, 7 gross tons small Canadian fishing vessel "GREYHOUND" is of closed construction and utilized in the salmon gillnet fishery. Located forward of amidships is the cabin incorporating the wheel-house, galley and accommodation. One additional berth and a head is situated in the forecastle. A number of hazards on the afterdeck, including rises and stepdowns, require that a person moving around in that area be sure-footed and agile; more so, as in this instance, when the deck was wet from shipped sprays.

The "GREYHOUND" departed anchorage at San Juan, B.C. at about 0700 September 27, 1988, bound for Victoria, B.C. As both the owner/operator and the deck-hand had been ill with influenza throughout the week, they had decided to secure the vessel at Victoria and go home until they were feeling better. The owner/operator was reportedly in a worse condition than the deck-hand: he reportedly had consumed an unknown quantity of sleeping pills throughout the week. While en route from San Juan to Victoria, B.C., the operator would come out of the forecastle periodically, check the vessel's progress and return to his bunk.

Weather conditions were described as fair with 15 to 20 knot westerly winds, good visibility and 0.3 m to 0.6 m seas.

Between Race Rocks and Albert Head, B.C., the operator entered the cabin, made a sandwich and having consumed half, he returned to his bunk. Shortly after, at 1320, he was observed exiting the cabin in a hurry, in the direction of the afterdeck. About five minutes later, the deck-hand throttled down the motor and called out to the operator. When no response was received to his calls, the deck-hand searched the vessel and when it became evident that the operator was no longer on board, he turned the vessel around and began to search for the operator. At 1333, he advised Victoria Coast Guard Radio Station (CGRS) on channel 16, VHF, of the situation, thus initiating official SAR response.

An area with a 25 mile radius was searched by marine and air units with negative results. The search was placed on reduced status at 1716 and the case handed over to the RCMP as a missing person case. The "GREYHOUND" then proceeded to Victoria and secured alongside at 1900. At the time of writing this report, the victim remains missing and is presumed to have drowned.

Findings

At approximately 1325 on September 27, 1988 the owner/-operator of the fishing vessel "GREYHOUND" disappeared overboard while the vessel was transitting the area between Race Rocks and Albert Head, B.C.

In the absence of any eyewitnesses, the precise cause for his falling overboard is not known but it would appear that the following factors contributed to the accident:

- the operator was very ill with what appeared to have been influenza and had reportedly consumed an unknown quantity of medication throughout that week;

- the consumption of sleeping tablets would have induced some drowsiness and thus the operator could neither be sure-footed nor agile;

- shortly after attempting to eat a sandwich, he was observed hurriedly exiting the cabin and rushing towards the afterdeck; and

- the moderate rolling of the vessel in the 0.3 m to 0.6 m seas may have caused the victim to loose his balance or slip and fall overboard.

Subsequent to falling overboard, it would appear that the operator lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- valuable time was lost before the operator was noticed missing as he was not seen falling overboard;

- the engine noise could have prevented any call for help from being heard by the deck-hand;

- the victim was not wearing any form of PFD; and

- the cold water and his generally weakened physical condition could have adversely affected his chances of survival.

Other Findings

The ship radio station was not licenced pursuant to the Radio Act and neither of the crew members aboard the "GREYHOUND" were in possession of a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate as required by General Radio Regulations, Part II.


POSITION OF VESSEL WHEN OWNER FOUND MISSING AT 01:25
POSITION DU NAVIRE QUAND LE PROPRIÉTAIRE A ÉTÉ PORTÉ DISPARU À 01:25
044°(T)(V)
037°(T)(V)
046°(T)(V)
PARRY BAY
Metchosin Creek
Metchosin
DND / MDN
WA
WQ
021°-E 198°(S-W)
48°20'N
123°30'W
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER ISLAND
NANAIMO
VICTORIA
"GREYHOUND"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3440
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 3440 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
Adjoining Chart / Carte adjacente 3461

F.V. "GREYHOUND"
B.P. "GREYHOUND"

Glossary

CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CCGC	Canadian Coast Guard Cutter
CCGS	Canadian Coast Guard Ship
CGRS	Coast Guard Radio Station
CMRA	Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary
ETA	Estimated time of arrival
Fish Packers	Fishing vessels being used only for transportation of fish
FPV	Fisheries Patrol Vessel
Free surface effect	Whenever there is a surface of liquid which is free to move, there is a loss of effective GM due to a virtual rise of the vessel's centre of gravity and the loss of stability caused by the movement of liquid in partially filled compartments when the vessel rolls. This movement may involve a large shift of weight.
Freeboard	The distance between the waterline and the upper edge of the weather deck.
FV	Fishing Vessel
GM	The distance between the transverse metacentre and the vertical centre of gravity, and is an indication of a vessel's ability to right herself when heeled over.
M	Magnetic
Mayday	Distress signal
MEDEVAC	The urgent evacuation of a person from a vessel for medical reasons
MRSC	Marine Rescue Sub-Centre

Port of refuge	A reasonably safe place of retreat from winds or storms
r.p.m.	Revolutions per minute
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
SAR	Search and Rescue
SFV	Small fisning vessel
SIC	Steamship Inspection Certificate
SSB	Single sideband radio
T	True
Trim	The difference between the draught forward and aft
VHF	Very high frequency radio